In the context of Afghanistan, the United States did not have as much of an interest during the 1950’s and 1960s even as the state was war ravaged. As researchers argue the United States had but peripheral interest in the country. However, the peripheral interest held by the United States changed over time as the US realized that Afghanistan, and the Taliban formations could challenge its security. This was a time when the US finally realized that it could be challenged in power, and threatened with terrorism. The September 11, 2001 incident was more of a trigger for a process of self-interest actions that the United States was already pursuing.
There are six principles to political realism presented by Morgenthau and it was seen that the United States in its counter actions on Afghanistan was seen to adhere to every one of them. The first of the principle is that society will act with their roots in human nature (Ashley, 1981). This literally means that all politics is derived from human nature. The second principle is that political realism in the context of intention political relations is usually defined in power (Gilpin, 1984). Thirdly, the power that is considered in realism is not fixed. The power is defined by different instances of interests. It will be associated with domination and sometimes even physical and military violence. The fourth principle states that in the context of pursuing political action, the moral implications are significant to the state. Yet the state decides to pursue the risk, despite the moral implications (Tucker, 1952). The fifth principle is that in political realism there won’t be any comparison with moral aspects undertaken by a nation and the global moral understanding. The final principal once again states that national interest takes central position and the autonomy of the political sphere is more important.